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Abstract 
This paper makes two linked contributions. First, we argue that planning systems, instead of 
being correct (every plan returned achieves the goal) and complete (all such plans are returned), 
should be approximately correct and complete, in that most plans returned achieve the goal and 
that most such plans are returned. The first contribution we make is to formalize this notion. 
Our second aim is to demonstrate the practical importance of these ideas. We argue that the 
cached plans used by case-based planners are best thought of as approximate as opposed to exact, 
and also show that we can use our approach to plan for subgoals gr and g2 separately and to 
combine the plans generated to produce a plan for the conjoined goal go A gz. The computational 
benefits of working with subgoals separately have long been recognized, but attempts to do so 
using correct and complete planners have failed. 
1. Introduction 
When we talk about a plan for achieving a goal, we typically mean not one plan but 
many. As an example, if I say on Thanksgiving that my plan for preparing a turkey 
involves stuffing and roasting it, I hardly mean that these are the only actions I will 
take between now and when the turkey is done. I may also plan on making sweet 
potatoes and pumpkin pie, buying a bottle of wine, calling family members to wish 
them happy holidays, and other actions even further removed from my stated goal of 
turkey preparation. 
In fact, my plan “stuff the turkey and then roast it” might be represented something 
like this: 
[ . . . stuff . . . roast . . .] (1) 
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Fig. 1. Get A on B on C without building a four-block tower. 
where the ellipses denote currently undetermined action sequences that I might inter- 
sperse into the above plan. If I need to roast the turkey immediately after stuffing it, I 
might write that as 
[ . . . stuff roast. . .] (2) 
where the second set of ellipses has been dropped. 
There are, of course, many instances of ( 1) that are unsatisfactory. Perhaps I run the 
turkey through a paper shredder before beginning preparation, or unstuff it after stuffing 
it, or garnish it liberally with peanut butter before serving. In what sense can we say 
that ( 1) is our plan when so many things can go wrong? 
The conventional approach to this problem is to deal not with plans such as that 
appearing in ( 1) , but with far more specific plans such as 
[stuff yams telephone roast eat] (3) 
where there are guaranteed to be no extraneous actions that might interfere with our 
achieving our goal. But from a practical point of view, the plan (3) is nearly worthless, 
since it is almost inconceivable that I execute it exactly as written. 
There are many other examples of this phenomenon. If we intend to construct plans 
by retrieving them from a library of known solutions to similar problems (so-called 
case-based planning [ 14]), it is important hat the plans in the library include some 
measure of flexibility. After all, it is unlikely that the new situation in which we find 
ourselves will be an exact match for the situation in which the plan was constructed. 
Our ability to plan for conjunctive goals rests on similar ideas. When possible, it is 
important hat we plan for conjuncts eparately and then merge the results; this appears 
to require that the solutions to the individual conjuncts be plan schemas uch as ( 1). 
Planning for conjuncts separately enables us to take computational dvantage of the 
benevolence of our environment as reflected in the frame assumption-we can typically 
achieve one subgoal and then not worry about it while we work on other things. 
Another example of a conjunctive planning problem appears in Fig. 1. The goal is to 
get A on B and B on C, but there is a restriction to the effect that one cannot build a 
four-block tower. 
For a human planner, the problem is easy. We realize that the general plan for getting 
B onto C is simply to move it there, and similarly for getting A on B. When we combine 
these two plans, however, we encounter a problem-the action of moving A to B will 
fail. We therefore modify the plan for getting B onto C, adding the additional action of 
moving C to the table. 
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I presented this problem to the authors of two generative planning systems-Minton 
(PRODIGY [ 171) and Wilkins ( SIPE [ 211) . Both reported (personal communication) 
that the problem would pose no significant difficulties for them and that they could solve 
it by adding an additional precondition to the action move(x, y) to the effect that y had 
to be either on the table or on a block z that was on the table. 1 
The problem with this approach is that it doubles the branching factor for all plan- 
ning problems. This will lead to prohibitive computational difficulties as the problems 
involved get larger; imagine having to move a block prior to constructing a 13-block 
tower in a domain that prohibits 1Cblock ones. As an example of the immediacy of 
these difficulties, Penberthy and Weld’s UCPOP system [181 proved incapable of solving 
the four-block version of the problem in Fig. 1 without he inclusion of domain-specific 
control information. * 
Worse still is the fact that the branching factor is being increased on all problems, 
not just those that involve tall towers. Imagine, for example, that we can only put a blue 
block on a red one if the red block is on the table. The branching factor will still be 
doubled even if we are working in a domain without blue blocks! 3 
Explicit control rules provide potential ways around these particular difficulties, but 
their use is problematic. What control rule are we to use if the previous domain includes 
painting actions, so that the colors of blocks can change? What control rule would allow 
us to efficiently solve the problem in Fig. 1 if the constraint were changed so that only 
jive-block towers were prohibited? 
Related problems appear in plan debugging. If a human planner discovers a bug in 
one portion of a plan to achieve a complex goal, the typical response is to restrict the 
impact of the bug to a small portion of the analysis and to then plan around the problem. 
That we can make modifications that address the bug without destroying the effect of 
the original plan depends on our commonsense ability to construct and manipulate plans 
like ( I)-plans that, while not holding universally, do hold in general. 
My intention in this paper is to develop a formalization of the ideas that are implicit 
in the plan ( 1)) and to then describe the use of these constructs in conjunctive planning. 
Please bear with me while we work through the mathematics, ince there are a variety 
of fundamentally new ideas that we need to formalize. 
( 1) We first need to describe plans that can have new actions added to them in 
arbitrary ways but that can still include the immediacy requirements of a plan 
such as (2). This is our goal in the next section, where we also present a variety 
of mathematical results about these new plans that will be needed later. 
(2) We next need to define conditions under which a plan approximately achieves 
a goal. The basic idea here is that a plan P is approximately correct if most 
instances of P that could actually be executed o indeed achieve the goal. We 
1 Wilkins made the alternative suggestion of creating two move operators. This is equivalent in practice, 
however; doubling the branching factor by introducing a second move operator is equivalent to doubling it by 
introducing a disjunction into the precondition. 
*Will Harvey, personal communication. The problem is not one of time, but of space; UCPOP reported that 
it had exhausted its available memory while working on this problem. 
s This is assuming that we treat color as a precondition and not as a filter. We would need to do this if there 
were actions available that changed blocks’ colors. 
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formalize this in Section 3 by introducing the idea of an exception to a plan and 
formalizing conditions under which plans hold sufficiently frequently that we are 
prepared to treat them as approximately correct. 
(3) The problem of building a planner around these ideas is discussed in Sections 4 
and 5. Section 4 discusses the theoretical issues involved in the construction of 
the planner, showing that it is indeed possible to plan for conjuncts eparately 
using our ideas. Section 5 discusses a preliminary implementation of our work. 
(4) Concluding remarks are contained in Section 6, and proofs have been deferred 
to an appendix. 
Let me end this introduction with something of a disclaimer. I do not mean to imply 
that existing implemented systems are incapable of manipulating expressions uch as 
( 1) . Tate’s O-Plan system, for example [2,201, appears to use ideas such as these rou- 
tinely. But planners that behave in this fashion have thus far lacked formal foundation, 
and correcting that is my intention here. In providing a solid formal foundation for 
nonlinear planning, McAllester and Rosenblitt’s paper [ 161 was both a step forward 
and a step back; although it formalized many ideas that had previously eluded precise 
description, it omitted many of the procedural tricks that make implemented planners 
effective. As a result, formally well-grounded planners uch as that described by Pen- 
berthy and Weld [ 181 typically exhibit performance far worse than that of the informal 
systems that preceded them. My hope here is to shed some formal light on the ideas 
that have proven so effective in practice. 
2. Plans 
I will adopt the view that a plan is a partially ordered collection of actions, where an 
action is a functional expression such as move( a, b) : 
Definition 2.1. An action is either a variable or a functional expression, where the 
arguments to the function may themselves include variables. A ground action is an 
action that contains no variables. 
By an action such as move( a, ?) we will mean the action of moving a to the location 
? where ? will presumably be determined by other considerations. 
We cannot now simply define a plan to be a partially ordered sequence of actions, 
since we need to be able to distinguish between (1) and (2). In some cases, we will 
want the action a to precede b immediately, while in others, there may be many actions 
interspersed between the two. We handle this as follows: 
Definition 2.2. A plan is a triple (A, <, *) where A is a finite collection of actions and 
< is a partial order on A; by a Q b for actions a, b E A we mean that a must precede 
b. * is another binary relation on A with * c <, so that whenever u * b, a < b as well. 
We will assume that * and < also satisfy the following conditions: 
(1) Ifc*aandc<b,thenu<b. 
(2) If b * c and a < c, then a < b. 
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We will take a * b to mean that b is a successor of a for which no intermediate actions 
are permitted. 
Note that the definition refers to A as a collection instead of as a set; this is to 
allow the same action to appear multiple times in the partial order. To understand the 
additional conditions, suppose that a is an immediate successor of c, so that c * a. Now 
if b is some other successor of c, then a must precede b as well. The second condition 
is the dual of the first. 
In practice, plans are bounded by initial and terminal actions. We model this by 
requiring that plans contain dummy initial and terminal actions denoted by di and d, 
respectively: 
Definition 2.3. A plan (A, <, *) will be said to be bounded if di E A and d, E A with 
di < a and d, > a for all a E A. 
We will assume throughout this paper that all plans are bounded. 
The general turkey-roasting plan ( 1) corresponds to the partial order 
di < stuff < roast < d, 
while the plan that roasts the turkey immediately after stuffing it corresponds to 
di < stuff * roast < dr. 
The second inequality has been made an instance of *. 
Before proceeding, let me spend a moment discussing the difference between *, our 
annotation for the links in a partially-ordered plan, and the causal annotations introduced 
by McAllester and Rosenblitt [ 161. 
McAllester and Rosenblitt’s links serve more a bookkeeping function than anything 
else; the information they contain (which action is intended to achieve which precon- 
dition) could be recovered, if need be, from the plan being constructed. Recording the 
information on the arcs serves the computational purpose of making the plans more 
efficient to work with. 
Our * annotation is different. Annotating an arc with * makes the associated plan a 
semantically different object, in the sense that we have added a new constraint o the 
set of linearizations of the given plan. Note also that our language is fundamentally 
more flexible than McAllester and Rosenblitt’s-we allow the addition of arbitrary new 
actions to plans, while they do not. This is important, since it enables us to work with 
the flexible plan ( 1) instead of the far more restrictive (3). 
Lemma2.4. Zf(A,<,*) isuplun, thenforunyu,b,cEA: 
(1) Ifa*bundu*c, then b=c. 
(2) Ifa*cundb*c, thenu=b. 
An action can have at most one immediate predecessor r successor. 
Suppose now that we have some plan (A, <, *). If there is a chain 
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c = co * s . . * cn = a 
and c 6 b, then b must either be one of the CL’S or it must follow a; there is no other 
“room” between c and a. The following lemmas capture this, where we have written Z 
for the transitive closure of *: 
Lemma25 Let (A,<,*) beaplan. Thenforanya,b,cEA: 
(1) Ifc<bandcJCa, theneithercZbora<b. 
(2) Ifb<candaZc, theneitherbicorb<a. 
Lemma2.6. Let(A,<,*) beaplan.Thenforanya,b,cEA,ifa;i;banda<c<b, 
then a 13; c. 
It is also straightforward to define conditions under which two plans are equivalent 
or one is an instance of the other: 
Definition 2.7. Two plans Pt and P2 will be called equivalent if they are identical up 
to variable renaming. 
Definition 2.8. A plan (AI, <I, *I) is an instance of another plan (AZ, <2,*2) if there 
is a binding list (+ and a l-l mapping i : A2 + A1 with the following properties: 
(1) For each a E AZ, i(a) = al,. In other words, the mapping i maps a to an action 
that is the same as that constructed by applying the bindings in u to a. 
(2) i( 62) C 61. Every ordering constraint on the second plan appears in the first as 
well. 
(3) i(*2) G *I. 
An example will probably help. If the stuff and roast actions accept an argument 
but the eat action doesn’t, 
[ . . . stuff (turkey) roast (turkey) . . . eat] 
is an instance of 
(4) 
I . . . stuff (?) roast(?) . . .]. 
The plan (4) corresponds to the partial order 
di < stuff (turkey) * roast(turkey) < eat * d, 
while (5) corresponds to 
di < stuff (?) *roast(?) < dt. 




X, if x = di or x = d,, 
i(x) = stuff(turkey), if x = stuff(?), 
roast( turkey), if x = roast (?>, 
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and the binding list (T binds ? to turkey. 
It is clear that for each action x, i(x) = &. The image of f in (7) under i is the 
partial order 
di < stuff (turkey) < roast( turkey) < d, 
and is clearly included in the partial order of (6) ; the image of * under i contains the 
single pair 
stuff(turkey)*roast(turkey) 
and is once again contained in the * of (6). 
Proposition 2.9. The instance relation of Definition 2.8 is a partial order. 
We will write Pt S P2 to denote the fact that a plan PI is an instance of another plan 
p2. 
We have been careful in our definitions not to restrict the number of new actions 
that can be inserted between any two actions of the plan itself. When it comes time to 
actually execute the plan, however, we will need to select a specific action sequence. 
Definition 2.10. A plan P = (A, 6, *) will be called linear if the following conditions 
hold: 
( 1) Every action in A is ground. 
(2) 3 =<. 
A linear plan that is an instance of a plan P will be called a linearization of P. 
In other words, a linearization of a plan replaces all of the variables with object 
constants and selects an ordering of the actions involved that can be derived solely from 
the immediacy conditions of *. This latter condition implies that no additional actions 
can be added to the plan. 
As an example, the linear plan (3) corresponds to the partial order 
di * stuff * yams * telephone * roast * eat * d,. 
There is no way to add another action to this ordering without having it either precede 
di, follow dt, or violate the conditions of Definition 2.2. 
Lemma 2.11. If P = (A, <, *) is a linear plan, then 6 is a total order. 
Proposition 2.12. PI C P2 if and only if the set of linearizations of PI is a subset of 
the set of linearizations of P2. 
Given the above result, it makes sense to think of a plan in terms of its linearizations; 
each linearization is a way in which we might actually go about executing the actions 
in the plan. 
Definition 2.13. A plan set is a set of linear plans. 
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3. Approximate correctness 
Given now that there will almost inevitably be mistakes we can make, in the sense 
that there are linearizations of a given plan that do not actually achieve our intended 
result, how can we formalize the idea that the plan in ( 1) is correct “in general”? 
The solution we will use is an extension of an idea I proposed in 1991 [lo]. As an 
example, suppose that I am trying to get block A onto block B in the blocks world. A 
is clear, but C is currently on top of B and a wide variety of other blocks are scattered 
around the table. Here is my plan for achieving the goal: 
[move(C, ?) move(A, B)]. (8) 
I plan to move C out of the way, and then move A onto B. I’ve assumed just for the 
moment hat no additional actions can be added; our interest here involves the variable 
? that appears in (8). 
Note that there is one location to which we should not move the block currently on 
top of B-if we relocate it to A, B will become clear but A no longer will be. Given 
this, in what sense is (8) a solution to our problem? 
It is a solution in that there are many places to which we can move C, and the one 
that doesn’t work is in some sense pathological - most locations do work. What we 
need to do is to capture the way in which the set of exceptions is small relative to the 
set of possibilities. 
From a formal point of view, the exception involves a specific binding for the vari- 
able ?. This leads us to the following: 
Definition 3.1. Given a binding list u and a plan P = (A, <, *), the result of applying 
(+ to P is defined to be that plan where the actions in A have had the binding list applied 
to them but the plan is otherwise unchanged. This plan will be denoted PI,. 
We can, for example, bind ? to A in (8) to obtain 
[move(C,A) move(A, B)]. 
The following result is obvious: 
Lemma 3.2. Given a plan P and binding list a, PI, 2 P. 0 
We are now in a position to describe conditions under which one set of plans is 
“small” relative to another. We need to be careful, however, since plans generally have 
infinitely many linearizations and we can’t simply say that Q is small relative to P if Q 
has many fewer linearizations than P does. Instead, we will say that Q is small relative 
to P if Q = P(, but Q # P. The motivation behind this definition is that there are 
generally many ways to bind any particular variable and Q is committed to a specific 
choice. 
In the following definition, we will say that Q is of measure 0 in P instead of simply 
saying that Q is small relative to P. The term is borrowed from real analysis, and we use 
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it because the formal definition of smallness has many of the same properties as does 
the analytic definition on which it is modelled. (The finite union of small sets is small, 
for example.) The 0 means that the ratio of the size of Q to that of P is approximately 
0; we will also say that Q is “of measure 1” in P if this ratio is approximately 1, so 
that Q and P are comparably sized. 
Definition 3.3. A plan Q will be said to be of measure 0 in a plan P if Q # P but 
Q = PI, for some binding list cr. A plan or plan set Q will also be said to be of measure 
0 in a plan or plan set P if either of the following conditions is satisfied: 
( 1) Q is the finite union of sets of measure 0 in P. 
(2) There exist plan sets R and S with Q G R and both R and S - P of measure 0 
in S. 
The requirement that Q # P ensures that the binding list CT is not trivial. 
The second condition in the definition handles cases where Q is a subset of a set of 
measure 0 in P (take S = P), or where, for example, one specific linearization has been 
removed from P. Adding that linearization back to P should not impact the question 
of whether Q is of measure 0 in P (take S to be the union of P and the missing 
linearization). 
As an example, the plan 
[ . . . move(a, b) . . .] 
is of measure 0 in the plan 
(9) 
[ . . . move( a, ?) . . .] 
since the variable ? has been bound to a constant in (9). But the plan 
(10) 
[ . . . move( a, b) ] (11) 
is not of measure 0 in the plan (9), since the difference between the two plans is not 
the binding of a variable but the fact that the action move(a, b) is the final action in 
( 11) (i.e., an immediate predecessor of the plan’s terminal action) but not in (9). For 
similar reasons, a plan where two actions al and a2 are sequential is not of measure 0 
in the plan where the actions are unordered. 
Since (9) is of measure 0 in the plan set (10) and ( 11) is an instance (i.e., a subset) 
of (9)) ( 11) is of measure 0 in ( 10) as well. Finally, (9) is also of measure 0 in the 
plan set given by removing 
[ . . . move(a, c) . . .] (12) 
from ( 10). After all, if binding ? to b reduces us to a set that is small relative to the set 
of all possible bindings, removing a single one of those possible bindings in advance 
shouldn’t change this conclusion. The second condition in Definition 3.3 allows us to 
continue to measure the size of a plan set relative to (10) even after ( 12) has been 
removed. 
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What about adding new actions to a plan? If we add variable actions, the result 
will in general not be of measure 0 in the original plan; we are only committing to 
doing “something” and most of the linearizations of the original plan include additional 
actions of one form or another in any event. But if we add a specific action, the story 
is different: 
Proposition 3.4. Let P be a plan, and P’ an instance of P with i the associated injection 
from A to A’. Then if there is any action in A’ - i(A) that is not a variable, P’ is of 
measure 0 in P. 
Definition 3.5. A plan set Q will be said to be of measure 1 in P if P -Q is of measure 
0 in P. Two plans sets will be called approximately equal if each is of measure 1 in the 
other. 
Lemma 3.6. Q is of measure 0 in P if any of the following conditions holds: 
(1) Q is empty. 
(2) Q is a subset of a set of measure 0 in P. 
(3) Q is of measure 0 in a subset of P. 
(4) Q is of measure 0 in a superset S of P with P of measure 1 in S. 
Lemma 3.7. Q is of measure 0 in P if and only if Q is of measure 0 in P U Q. 
Proposition 3.8. Approximate equality is an equivalence relation. 
We also have the following: 
Proposition 3.9. Let P # 0 be a plan set. Then provided that our language includes 
infinitely many object and action constants, there is no plan set that is both of measure 
0 and of measure 1 in P. 
It is this result that gives teeth to the ideas we are proposing; if there were a plan of 
both measure 0 and measure 1 in P, we would be able to return as “generally correct” 
plans that in fact failed for large fractions of their linearizations. 
The requirement that there be infinitely many constants is a necessary one. If, for 
example, there were only 37 places to which an object could be moved, we could use 
the fact that each specific choice is of measure 0 in the overall plan to conclude that 
the union of all of them was-thereby violating Proposition 3.9. Similarly, if the set of 
actions we could take were circumscribed in some way, we could use Proposition 3.4 
to find a counterexample to the above proposition. 
Finally, we present some technical results that we will need later. We begin by 
recalling the usual definition of convergence for a sequence Si of sets: 
Definition 3.10. Let Si be a sequence of (plan) sets. Then we will say that the Si 
converge to a set S if for any X, there is some index m(x) such that for i > m(x), 
x E Si if and only if x E S. 
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Lemma 3.11. Suppose we have a sequence Pi of plan sets, where Pi+1 is of measure 0 
in Pi for each i. Then the Pi converge to the empty set. 
Every infinite descending chain where each element is of measure 0 in the previous 
one converges to the empty set. 
It is not the case that there is no infinite descending chain of plan sets, each of 
measure 0 in the previous one. For any function constant f, we can get such a chain by 
considering 
[move(x,?)] 3 [move(x, f(?>>] 3 [move(x, f(f(?)>>l 3 -... 
Lemma 3.12. Suppose S is of measure 1 in T and of measure 0 in U. Then T is of 
measure 0 in U. 
Suppose that we denote by A 8 B the symmetric difference of A and B, so that 
AeB=(A-B)U(B-A). 
We now have: 
Proposition 3.13. Suppose that there is some set D that is of measure 1 in A 8 B and 
of measure 0 in A. Then A and B are approximately equal. 
4. Planning 
Having introduced these notions, we need to use them to construct a planner. Before 
doing so, however, let me be clear about the problem that I am hoping to address. Our 
focus here is on planning itself, as opposed to reasoning about action or simulation. In 
other words, we will assume that the semantics of actions are somehow provided to us; 
somewhat more specifically, we assume that given a linear plan L and a goal g, we have 
some way to tell whether or not g holds after L is executed. From a formal point of 
view, we will assume that given a goal g, we can take L(g) to be the set of all linear 
plans that achieve g. The analysis we are about to present is independent of the specific 
semantics of action underlying the function L. 
In the examples, of course, we will need to rely on a specific semantics of action. For 
the blocks world, this semantics is presumably intuitive and corresponds to the usual 
STRIPS description. The only difference between our interpretation and the conventional 
one is that we need some way to interpret actions that are attempted even though their 
preconditions are not satisfied; we will take the view that such actions simply have no 
effect on the domain in question. 
We now make the following definition: 
Definition 4.1. A planning system P accepts as input a goal g and a plan set P. It 
returns a plan set P(g, P) c P that is approximately equal to L(g) 17 P. In some cases, 
we will assume that the goal is fixed, writing Pg for the corresponding function that 
accepts the plan set P only. 
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The plan set P can be used to focus the planner’s attention on plans of a particular 
form. The condition that P(g, P) be of measure 1 in L(g) II P means that almost all- 
but not necessarily all-of the plans in P that would achieve g are actually returned by 
the planner. In more picturesque terms, the planner is “approximately complete”. 
The condition that L(g) n P be of measure 1 in P(g, P) means that almost all 
the plans returned by the planner achieve the goal; in other words, the planner is 
approximately correct. In a situation like this, where L(g) is of measure 1 in a plan set 
P, we will often say that P “generally achieves” g. 
In the remainder of this section, we will begin by discussing planning systems in 
general, describing implementation concerns that are likely to arise in their construction. 
There are then two technical issues that we will address. First, we will show that a 
planning system can be used to produce answers to planning queries that actually are 
correct and complete, at least in the limit. More precisely, we will show how a planning 
system can be used to construct a sequence of answers that converges on the actual set 
L(g). Second, we will show how a planning system can respond to a conjunctive goal 
gl A g2 by invoking itself only on the subgoals gi and g2 separately and then combining 
the results. More precisely, we will show how Ps,,,sz can be constructed from Pg, and 
Pg2. 
We begin by discussing Ps itself. On an intuitive level, the way Pg works is as 
follows: Given the goal g, we find the actions a that might succeed in establishing 
g. If the preconditions to these actions are in general satisfied (perhaps because these 
preconditions hold in the initial situation), we can take P(G) to be the union of plan 
sets of the form 
[... a . ..I (13) 
for each action a achieving . 
If the preconditions of a are not in general satisfied, we can invoke P recursively on 
each precondition, merge the results to obtain plans that enable a, and then append a 
to the end of such plans. The result ( 13) is in fact a special case of this observation; 
if the preconditions to a are known to hold in the initial state [ 1, these preconditions 
also hold in a plan set that is approximately equal to [. . .] (the set of all plans). The 
expression (13) is simply the result of appending a to the end of such plans. 
We will see in what follows that we are often interested not only in P,, which 
constructs plans for achieving g, but also in Pig, which tells us which elements of a 




In a system like TWEAK-[ 11, the exceptions involve finding what Chapman 
calls clobberers. New actions that make the plan work after all are called white 
knights. 
McAllester and Rosenblitt [ 161 describe potential flaws in a plan (where one 
action might overturn the consequences of another) as threats. Overcoming the 
threats involves adding new actions to the plan that ensure that the consequences 
of the action hold after all. 
Finally, we will discuss in Section 5 the use of a declarative system to construct 
Pg and Pyg. 
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Fig. 2. The Sussman anomaly. 
Before turning to technical issues, let us look at an example in a bit more detail. 
The problem we will consider is the well-known Sussman anomaly [ 191, shown in Fig. 
2. The goal is to get A on B and B on C. At this point, we consider the subgoals 
separately. 
The first of these involves simply getting B on C. This is generally achieved by the 
Plan 
[ . . . move(B, C) . . .]. (14) 
Although there are instances of (14) that do not succeed in getting B on C, there 
are only a finite number of ways for this to happen-something must be put on B 
or on C, or B has to be moved away from C at the end of the plan. Each of these 
exceptions is of measure 0 in ( 14), which is why the plan ( 14) generally achieves 
on( B, C). Furthermore, move( B, C) is the only action with on( B, C) in its add list, 
and the preconditions to this action hold in the initial situation. This implies that the 
plan set of ( 14) is approximately equal to the set of all plans for getting B onto C and 
we can take 
P(on(B,C), [. ..I) = [.. . move(B,C) . . .]. (13 
The two conditions of approximate quality are satisfied: Most plans that achieve the 
goal are instances of the above plan (in fact, they all are), and the exceptions are a set 
of measure 0 in (15). 
To continue the analysis, we compute 
P(lon(B,C), [. . . move(B,C) . . .I) 
in order to determine which elements of ( 15) are exceptions to the plan. There are two 
ways in which such exceptions might arise: One of the preconditions to the move action 
might fail to hold, or something might clobber the fact that B is on C after the action 
is executed. 
The action move(B,C) has two preconditions, that B be clear and that C be. B is 
clear in the initial situation, and the most general plan that clobbers this fact is 
[ . . . move(?, B) . . .]. 
It follows that the plan (14) will fail for the instance 
1 . . . move(?, B) . . . move(B,C) . . .]. (16) 
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There are still more specific plans that do manage to get B on C, but ( 16) is one general 
failure possibility. (Recall that once we move something onto B, we are assuming that 
the failed action of moving B to C simply has no effect on the locations of the blocks.) 
Another way for (14) to fail is given by 
[ . . . move(?, C) . . _ move( B, C) . . .] (17) 
where something is moved onto the top of C. 
The only remaining possibility is where B is not on C at the end of the plan because 
it is moved away. Combining this with (16) and ( 17), we see that we can take 
P(Ton(B,C),[... move(B,C) . ..I) =et Ue;?Ue3 
to be the union of the following three sets of exceptions: 
el= I... move(?, B) . . . move( B,C) . . .], 
e2 = [. . . move(?,C) . . . move(B,C) . . .], 
es= [... move(B,C) . . . move(B,?) . . .]. 
Each of these sets is of measure 0 in ( 15), as is their union. 
If we wish, we can continue the process, computing 
P(on(B,C),el UezUes) 
(18) 
to find those elements of the exception set that achieve the goal after all, and so on. As 
we will see shortly, a sequence constructed in this fashion will eventually converge on 
the set of all plans that achieve the goal of getting B on C. 
The second goal on( A, B) is more complicated, but only slightly so. It is generally 
achieved by 
[ . . . move(C,?) . . . move(A, B) . . .]. (19) 
Once again, there are only finitely many ways for (19) to fail - the binding for ? could 
be chosen poorly (A and B are bad choices), or additional actions could be added as 
in the previous case. (In keeping with Proposition 3.9, we are assuming that there are 
an infinite number of distinct locations on the table to which C could be moved.) The 
complete list of exceptions is as follows: 
f, = [... move(?l,C) . . . move(C,?) . . . move(A,B) . . .] 
f2 = [... move(?l,?) _. . move(C,?) . . . move(A, B) . . .] 
f3 = [... move(C,?) . . . move(?l,A) . . . move(A, B) . . .] 
f4 = [. . . [move(?l, B) & move(C,?)] . . . move(A, B) . . .] 
fs = [... move(C,?) . . . move(A, B) . . . move(A,?l) . . .] 
fs = [... move(C,A) . . . move(A,B) . . .] 
f7 =[**. move(C,B) . . . move(A,B) . . .]. 
(20) 
In f4, we have extended our notation somewhat, writing a & b for the plan of taking 
actions a and b without there being an ordering constraint between them. 
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In less formal terms, the plan ( 19) can fail for the following reasons: 
( 1) The attempt o move C out of the way can fail. This may happen because 
something has been moved on top of C ( fr ) or because something has already 
been moved to C’s intended estination (f~). 
(2) Something may be moved onto A (f3 or f6) or onto B (f4 or f7). We get two 
exceptions in each case here depending on whether the block moved into the 
way is C (fe and f7) or not (f~ and fd). 
(3) A may be moved off of B after it is put there (fs). 
Because all of the exceptions are of measure 0 in ( 19), ( 19) itself is a satisfactory 
choice for P(on(A, B), [. . .I). We also take 
P(lon(A,B), [. . . move(C,?) . . . move(A,B) . . .I) =Uft. 
We needed to be careful when constructing the above exceptions to take f3 as indi- 
cated instead of the more obvious choice 
fi = [. . . [move(?l,A) & move(C,?)] . . . move(A, B) . . .] (21) 
where we have allowed the action of moving something onto A to occur in parallel with 
the action of moving C out of the way. The reason is that if the action of moving ?I 
onto A is to interfere with the rest of the plan, this action must succeed-and it won’t 
unless C is moved out of the way first. Put more formally, the subset of f; that actually 
achieves on(A, B) includes a component that is approximately equal to 
[ . . . move(?l,A) . . . move(C,?) . . . move(A,B) . . .] (22) 
and is therefore not of measure 0 in f$. Again, recall that our semantics of failed actions 
is that they have no effect at all. Since A is not clear in Fig. 2, the first action of (22) 
fails and (22) effectively reduces to ( 19). 
From a computational point of view, it may be more attractive to work with f$ than 
to work with the more accurate f3 appearing in (20). The reason is that fi is already of 
measure 0 in the original plan ( 19), and it is simpler than f3 and therefore presumably 
easier to generate. It is obviously easier to stop as soon as a set of measure 0 in the 
original plan is encountered than to complete the analysis to obtain f3 instead of fi. 
This is exactly what commonsense planners should do-when we plan for one of a 
set of conjuncts, we only worry about what might go wrong until we feel confident in 
dismissing it. In our running example, we know that something will go wrong with the 
plan of moving A to B if we move an additional block onto A. The need for this extra 
action ensures that we are looking at a set of measure 0 in our overall plan, so we don’t 
think about it further. More specifically, we don’t bother to draw the conclusion that we 
can only move something onto A after C is cleared off the top of it. It is to remain in 
keeping with this approach that we may wish to work with fi instead of f3. 
The general version of this construction is similar. At each odd-numbered step (in- 
cluding the first), we look for plans that achieve the goal but that we have not yet 
identified. At even-numbered steps, we look for exceptions to the plans found thus far: 
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Definition 4.2. Given a planning system P and a goal g, the planning sequence gener- 
ated by P for g is given by 
Pi(g) = 
Pi-l(g) UP(g,P -Pi-l(g)), if i is odd, 
Pi-l(g) -P(7g~Pi-l(g))9 if i is even. 
(23) 
The sequence is initialized by PO(g) = 0. 
Some notation will make this definition easier to work with. If we write ZJ for 
the symmetric difference between Pi and Pi-l, it suffices to describe only how Di is 
computed at each step. We know that Di has to be added to Pi at odd steps and removed 
at even steps. Now (23) becomes: 
vi(g> = 
P(g,P -Pi-l(g)), if i is odd, 
P(7g9Pi-l(g))9 if i is even. 
(24) 
Further simplification is often possible as well. If i is even, for example, we can 
evaluate (24) recursively to get 
(25) 
If we know that we caught all of the exceptions at the (i - 2) nd step, we will know 
that P( Tg, Pi-T(g)) = 8 and we can replace (25) with the simpler 
Di(S) =P(7gv~i-1(8)). (26) 
In a similar way, if we know that Di-1 (g) includes all the plans that achieve g at an 
odd step, we can conclude 
Di(g> = P(g, Di-1 (g) 1. (27) 
In both (26) and (27), the purpose of each step is to correct possible incorrectness in
the previous step; possible incompleteness in the previous step is not an issue. 
We are now in a position to achieve the first of our two technical goals in this section: 
Theorem 4.3. Given a planning system P and a goal g, the planning sequence gener- 
ated by P for g converges to L(g). 
This result shows us how to construct a planner that is correct and complete from one 
that is approximately correct and approximately complete. 
Our remaining goal is that of showing how to combine the planner’s results for gl 
and for g2 to obtain a plan for gl A g2. Resumably, the semantics underlying L is such 
that a plan achieves the conjunctive goal gl A g2 if and only if it achieves both gl and 
g2, so that 
ml A g2) = Ug1) f-l L(g). 
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The following result is now obvious: 
Lemma 4.4. Suppose that PI achieves a goal gl and that P2 achieves g2. Then PI f~ P2 
achieves gl A g2. 0 
The problem, of course, is that PI f~ P2 may well be empty if PI and P2 are specific 
linear plans that achieve the goals. If we could weaken the above lemma to require only 
that the plans generally achieve their goals, we could use the fact that ( 14) generally 
achieves on( B, C) and that ( 19) generally achieves on( A, B) to conclude that a general 
solution to the Sussman anomaly is 
[ . . . move(B,C) & [move(C,?) . . . move(A,B)] . . .]. (28) 
This plan involves three actions-moving B to C, moving C out of the way, and 
moving A to B. C must be moved before A is put on B, but there are no other ordering 
constraints involved. Unfortunately, this is not a solution to the Sussman anomaly, since 
it allows the action of moving B to C to precede the action of moving C out of the 
way. Here is the general problem: 
Proposition 4.5. There exist plans PI, P2, Ql and Q2 with Qi of measure 0 in Pi but 
Ql fl Q2 of measure 1 in PI n P2. 
The Sussman anomaly isn’t quite this bad; the correct plan 
[.._ move(C,?)... move(B,C)... move(A,B) . ..I 
is neither of measure 0 nor of measure 1 in (28). If it were of measure 1 in (28), then 
(28) would generally achieve the original goal of getting A on B and B on C; if it 
were of measure 0, (28) would in general fail to achieve the goal. In fact, it succeeds 
some of the time and fails in others; it depends only on how we order the actions. 
The tower-construction problem of Fig. 1 is an example where Proposition 4.5 does 
hold. The plan 
[ . . . move( B,C) . ..I 
gets B on C, and 
[ . * . move(A, B) . . .] 
generally gets A on B. Nevertheless the plan for constructing the tower is of measure 0 
in 
[ . . . move(A, B) & move( B,C) . ..I 
because we must take the additional action of moving C to the table. In terms of the 
proposition, the Pi are the plans for achieving the subgoals, and the Qi are the exception 
sets for these plans. 
We cannot necessarily merge specific plans for achieving the individual conjuncts. 
Nor, as Proposition 4.5 tells us, can we necessarily find a plan for the conjunctive goal 
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by merging plans for generally achieving the conjuncts. But we do have the following, 
an immediate consequence of Theorem 4.3: 
Corollary 4.6. Given a planning system P and goals gl and g2, denote by Pi(g) the 
planning sequence generated by P for g. Then the sequence 
Pi(gl) n Pi(g2) (29) 
converges to L(gl A gz), the plan for achieving the conjunction of gl and gz. 0 
This result is evidence that we are on the right track, although we need to do a bit 
better-taking the limit in (29) will not be viable in practice. More precisely, we need 
a way to compute Pg,,,gz that we can guarantee to satisfy the requirements of Definition 
4.1, To see how to do this, let us look at the Sussman anomaly in a bit more detail. 
We already know how to construct the first two terms in the planning sequences for 
the subgoals; they are 
Pt(on(A,B)) = [... move(C,?)... move(A,B) . ..I. 
Pz(on(AW) =PI(MA,B)) -(J.fi, 
Pi(on(B,C)) = [. . . move(B,C) . . .], 
P2(on(B,C)) = Pt(on(B,C)) -Uei, 
where the ei and fi are given by ( 18) and (20) respectively. 
Let US denote the conjoined sequence in (29) by simply Pi. It now follows that the 
first element of this sequence is given by 
P, = [... move(B,C) & [move(C,?) , . . move(A,B)] . . .]. (30) 
The second element of the sequence involves removing from Pt the exceptions in 
either ( 18) or (20). We can compute these by combining, for example, the plan 
et = [... move(?l, B) . . . move(B,C) . . .] 
which is one of the three sets removed from Pt (on(B, C)), with 
(31) 
[. . . move(C,?) . . . move(A,B) . . .] (32) 
which is the original Pt (on( A, B)). (We have standardized apart the variables in et 
and Pt (on( A, B)), which is why the ? in (18) has been replaced with ?l in (31).) 
The result of this particular merge is the following set of three plans: 
[ . . . [move(?l, B) . . . move(B,C)] & [move(C,?) . . . move(A,B)] . . .], (33) 
1 . . . move(C,?) . . . move(A,B) . . . move(B,C) . . .], (34) 
[ . . . move(C, B) . . . [move(B,C) &move(A,B)] . ..I. (35) 
The first of the above plans is the “obvious” merge where the two separate plans are 
simply executed in parallel. In the second, the variable ?I is bound to A and the first 
M.L. Ginsberg/Arti$cial Intelligence 76 (1995) 89-123 107 
action in et is identified with the second action in Pt (on( A, B) ). The ordering on the 
resulting action sequence is accumulated from the orderings on et and on Pt (on( A, B) ) . 
The third plan is similar, with ? being bound to B and ?l bound to C. 
Each of the three plans fails to achieve the subgoal of getting B onto C. In (33), a 
new (and currently unidentified) block is moved onto B. In (34)) A is moved onto B 
before B is moved onto C. And finally, C itself is moved onto B in (35). 
It is only (34) that is of interest to us. The plan (33) is of measure 0 in the set of 
exceptions because it involves an additional action, and (35) is of measure 0 because 
it binds the variable ?. As we have already remarked, (34) tells us that if we move A 
to B before moving B to C, we will not achieve our overall goal because B will be 
occupied when we try to move it. 
We can continue in this fashion, accumulating all of the exceptions to the overall plan 
(30). In addition to (34)) the only plan not of measure 0 in the set of all exceptions is 
[ . . . move(B,C) . . . move(C,?) , . . move(A, B) . . .] 
which is part of the result of merging PI (on( B, C) ) and ft ; this tells us that if we 
move B to C too early, our plan for getting C out of the way en route to moving A 
will fail. 
We can conclude from all this that a generally valid plan for solving the Sussman 
anomaly is given by removing from the plan (30) the union of the two plans 
[ . . . move(C,?)... move(A,B)... move(B,C) . ..I. 
[... move(B,C)... move(C,?)... move(A,B) . ..I. 
The result is equivalent to the plan 
[. . . move(C,?) . . . move(B,C) . . . move(A,B) . . .] 
which is indeed the usual solution to the original problem. 
Here is the result dealing with the general situation: 
(34) 
Theorem 4.7. Suppose that we have a conjunctive goal gl A g2 and a set P. Construct 
the plan sequences Pi converging to L(gl ) n P and Qi converging to L(g2) f~ P. Now 
we can always$nd an i and a j such that both Pi 8 Pi+, and Qj 8 Qj+l are of measure 
0 in Pin Qj. For any such i and j, Pi n Qj will be approximately equal to L( gl Ag2) n P. 
In our analysis of the Sussman anomaly, we actually terminated the construction of the 
plans for the subgoals somewhat earlier than the points sanctioned by the above result. 
This early termination reflects some lookahead on our part; consider, for example, the 
fact that the exception 
et = [... move(?, B) . . . move( B, C) . . .] 
to the plan for getting B on C, when combined with the plan 
(37) 
[ . . . move(C,?) . . . move(A,B) . . .] (38) 
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Fig. 3. Get A on B on C without building a four-block tower. 
for getting A onto B, led to the exception 
[ . . . move(C,?) . . . move(A,B) . . . move(B,C) . . .] (39) 
to the general plan of moving B onto C in combination with (38). 
It turns out, however, that one set of measure 0 in el that actually achieves on( B, C) 
is 
[ . . . move(A,B) . . . move(B,C) . . .]. (40) 
The reason for this is that the initial action of moving A to B will fail (C is still in the 
way), so B will wind up on C after all. Now (39) is an instance of (40) and therefore 
might not be an exception to the general plan of getting B onto C. 
The recognition that binding ? to A in [. . . move( ?, B) . . . move( B, C) . . .] is an 
exception to the overall plan is subtle. Roughly speaking, we need the action of moving 
A to B to succeed (in order to achieve the other subgoal), so moving B to C will 
indeed be blocked. In terms of Theorem 4.7, (40) isn’t an exception to the plan for 
getting B on C, but 
[ . . . move(C,?) . . . move(A,B) . . . move(B,C) . . .] (41) 
is an exception, and that’s what matters. Once we have identified (41) as an exception 
to the original plan, the conditions of Theorem 4.7 are satisfied and we can construct 
the overall plan (36) with confidence. 
As a final example, let us consider the tower-construction problem once again. The 
problem is repeated in Fig. 3; recall that the goal is to get A on B and B on C without 
ever building a four-block tower. 
The planning sequence for getting B on C begins with 
PI = [... move( B, C) . . .] 
and exceptions given by 
el=[... move(?,B) . . . move(B,C) . . .], 
e2=[... move(?, C) . . . move( B,C) . . .], 
e3=[... move(B,C) . . . move(B,?) . . .], 
e4=[... move(?,?l) . . . move(C,?) . . . move(B,C) . . .]. 
(42) 
(43) 
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The final exception above involves situations where B cannot be moved to C because a 
four-block tower is involved. In practice, however, the exception (43) is less likely to 
be generated than is 
e;= [... move(C,?) . . . move(B,C) . . .]. (44) 
We realize that putting B on C can never violate the four-block constraint unless we 
first move C somewhere. We will temporarily work with e: instead of e4, just as we 
indicated the possibility of working with fi in (21) instead offs in (20) in the Sussman 
anomaly. 
In a similar way, the planning sequence for getting A on B begins with 
Q, = [... move( A, B) . . .] 
and exceptions 
(45) 
f,=[... move(?,A) . . . move(A, B) . . .], 
fz=[... move(?, B) . . . move(A, B) . . .], 
f3=[... move(A, B) . . . move(A,?) . . .], 
fi=[... move(B,?) . . . move(A,B) . . .]. 
When we combine this sequence with the previous one, we get 
Pl nQl = [... move(A,B) &move(B,C) . . .] 
and the exceptions include 
g1=[... move(A,B) . . . move(B,C) . . .] 
gz=[... move(B,C) . . . move(A, B) . . .] 
together with sets of measure 0 with respect to these. But 




since both possible orderings are eliminated. From a commonsense point of view, we 
can’t put A on B first because we will then be unable to get B to C, and can’t put B 
on C first because this might (and in fact does) make a three-block tower to which A 
cannot be added. 
There are two ways in which the analysis can be extended. The exceptions (47) and 
(48) are the result of intersections with (42) and (46), so one of these two sets must 
be analyzed further. Since fi is an approximation, it seems natural to work on this first, 
leading to 
f,=[... move(?,A) . . . move(A, B) . . .], 
f2=[... move(?, B) . . . move(A,B) . . .], 
f3=[... move(A, B) . . . move(A,?) . . .], 
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f4=[... move(B,C) . . . move(A,B) . . .], (49) 
fs=[... move(?,?l) . . . move(B,?) . . . move(A,B) . . .]. (50) 
The final line (50) indicates that one way to make B the top block in a three-block 
stack is to move ? to ?l and then B to ?. This is of measure 0 in our prospective 
solution (45), however, so we need not worry about it4 The problem continues to 
be (49), which is still enough to invalidate our original plan. We now have to choose 
between finding exceptions to (49), finding a way to move B to C without creating a 
three-block tower, and finding exceptions to (42), finding a way to move A to B before 
moving B to C. 
Let us suppose that we choose wrongly, so that we now have to look for instances of 
[ . . . move(?, B) . . . move( B, C) . . .] 
for which B actually ends up on C after all. Here is the most general solution: 
[. . move(?, B) . . . move(‘?,?l) . . . move(B,C) . . .]. (51) 
Unfortunately, this doesn’t help us with our original difficulty, since we need to bind ? 
to A and now 
[ . . . move(A, B) . . . move(A,?l) . . .] (52) 
is known to be an exception that fails to get A onto B. 
So we turn our attention to (49) ; if we begin by moving C, then we will in fact be 
able to move A to B after all. So we can achieve on(A, B) using the plan 
1 . . . move(C,?) . . . move(B,C) . . . move(A, B) . . .]. (53) 
Unfortunately, this still might not work, since moving C (potentially to the top of a 
three-block stack) may cause a problem in getting B to C as indicated in the original 
plan (44) for achieving this subgoal. But now we finally replace (44) with the more 
appropriate (43), allowing us to conclude that (53) does indeed generally achieve the 
goal of getting A on B and B on C. 
The analysis would be very different if we were to work with a more conventional 
planner. There, the fact that we cannot build a four-block tower would be encoded by 
adding a new precondition to the move operator, saying that in order to move x to y, 
either y must be on the table, or it must be on a block that is on the table. 
Now when we try to move B to C, we will naturally generate the plan of first moving 
C to the table (since C being on the table is one possible way to achieve the disjunctive 
precondition). This plan can then be extended to solve the problem but the plan itself 
has been constructed blindly instead of in response to an identified bug in the simple 
plan of putting B on C and then A on B. 
In our approach, the problem is identified in (46)) which is later refined into (49) 
and (53). A plan to overcome the four-block difficulty is generated only when it is 
needed, and not as part of a general attempt to get B onto C. 
4 As in the Sussman anomaly, we actually need to be a bit more careful but the details are not of interest. 
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There is another difference in the treatments of this example as well. Consider a 
conventional planner that proceeds by first planning to move B to C, and then planning 
to move A to B. When the difficulty is found and the plan for getting B onto C has 
to be modified, the ensuing backtrack will discard the plan for getting A onto B. Not 
much work is lost in our simple example, but in more complex problems it may be 
crucial to avoid replanning for the goal of getting A onto B. After all, the existing plan 
for achieving this subgoal is the correct one. 
The approach that we have described behaves in this fashion. The successive refine- 
ments to the plan for getting A onto B, beginning with the basic plan 
[ . . . move( A, B) . . .] 
and eventually culminating in 
[. . . move(C,?) . . . move(B,C) . . . move(A,B) . . .] 
all continue to use the fundamental plan (54). In fact, work is in some sense never 
discarded in our approach, since we proceed by gradually refining plan sets in ways that 
are suggested by the merging computations and by corresponding interactions among 
subgoals. In our framework, the plan for constructing the tower is built up by starting 
with the basic plans of moving B to C and A to B, and then debugging the result. This 
leads to a much more focussed search process than that associated with conventional 
methods. 
5. Implementation considerations 
In order to actually build a planning system based on the ideas that we have described, 
there are three separate problems that need to be addressed. First, we need to discuss 
the manipulation of plan sets, including the underlying operation of plan intersection. 
Second, we need to describe the construction of a system that can produce the plan sets in 
the first place. And finally, we need to discuss implementation details surrounding results 
like Theorem 4.7; there are several simple ideas that can make this result substantially 
more effective in practice. (Witness the footnote in the previous section.) We will deal 
with these issues in this order. 
5. I. Plan intersection and manipulating plan sets 
Plan intersection is often known as plan merging and has already been discussed by 
a variety of authors; typical is the treatment of Foulser et al. [ 41. The construction 
described there is related to ours, although not identical. Foulser et al. allow for the 
possibility that more than two plans be merged at once, but their plan description 
language is more restricted than ours. In keeping with conventional interests, they assume 
that the actions in a plan are sequential; no others can be interspersed as new information 
is obtained. As a result, they do not draw the distinction between < and * that was our 
focus in Section 2. 
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Nevertheless, the ideas introduced by Foulser and his coauthors [4] can be used to 
implement our somewhat more general notion of plan intersection. The method used 
continues to be that of treating sequences of actions (actions related by Z in our notation) 
as atomic units, and then merging larger structures made up of these units. The details 
are not of any great theoretical interest and the interested reader is referred to the code 
itself. 5 
One thing that does bear mention is that the result of intersecting two plans may be 
a plan set that cannot be represented as a single plan; witness the construction of (33), 
(34) and (35) from the intersection of (3 1) and (32). The implementation obviously 
needs to cater to this possibility. 
Manipulating general plan sets is a bit more interesting. This is quite a difficult 
problem but is made simpler in practice by the recognition that the plan sets under 
consideration are generally of the form 
D,-D2UD3-D4UD~-..~ (55) 
where the Di are the symmetric differences of successive ‘Pi and are in general fairly 
simply represented. The evaluation here is intended to be from left to right, so that (55) 
is in fact 
(((D,-D2)uD3)-D4)uD5-.... 
The implementation is constructed in just this way, representing any particular plan set 
as an alternating sum such as (55). Taking the union or intersection of these alternating 
sums is tedious but not terribly difficult. 
Of course, the manipulations involved are fundamentally dependent on the plan in- 
tersection operation that we described earlier. Existing planners work with global data 
structures, gradually accumulating actions into an overall plan. This makes their plans 
somewhat brittle, since they will need to discard a great deal of existing work when a 
portion of the plan changes. A system such as we have described plans for subgoals 
separately but must frequently merge the plans involved in order to understand possible 
subgoal interactions. 
The upshot of this is that the speed of a planner built on our ideas will be crucially 
dependent on the speed of the underlying mechanism for plan merging; as Foulser 
et al. point out, plan merging can be exponentially expensive. They also point out, 
however, that this exponential expense appears not to be incurred in practice because 
the plans being merged consist of small numbers of linear segments. This matches 
our experience. Finally, since specific plan segments tend to appear many times in the 
analysis, the overall computation can be speeded substantially by caching the results of 
the merging computation in some way. 6 
’ The code described in this section is part of the MVL theorem proving system [ 5,9,11], which can be. 
obtained by anonymous ftp from t.uoregon.edu. 
6 More effective still appears to be to cache the results of the plan instance computation. 
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5.2. Constructing plan sets 
Given an implementation that manipulates plan sets, from where are we to obtain 
these sets in the first place? There are three sources: 
( 1) Information about the initial situation (corresponding to the plan [ ] ) can be 
encoded in this fashion. Thus in the tower-construction example, we know that 
on(C, D) is definitely achieved by the plan [ 1. It follows that on(C, D) is 
generally achieved by the universal plan set [. . .]. 
(2) Information about actions occurring (although perhaps not succeeding) is en- 
coded similarly. For any action a, the statement “a has just occurred” is true for 
theplan [... a]. What this says is that a occurs at the end of any sequence of 
actions that does indeed end in a. 
(3) Finally, there are operations that transform plan sets into new plan sets. We have 
already seen one of these in the form of intersection; another corresponds to the 
frame axiom in our setting. 
Definition 5.1. There exists a frame operator F that accepts as input two plan sets and 
returns another plan set. The operator is defined so that if a particular goal or fluent g 
is inserted into the database by those plans in the set P+ and deleted from the database 
by those plans in P-, then L(g) = F(P+, P-). 
Somewhat less formally, the goal is achieved by plans in F( P+, P- ) and not achieved 
by plans outside this set. Note that the equality in the definition is exact, not approximate. 
As an example, we would expect o have 
F’([ 1,0> = [...I. (56) 
What this tells us is that if a fluent is true in the initial situation, and we know of no 
reason for it to be false in other situations, we can expect it to be true at all times. 
Here is another example: 
F([... a],0> = [... a . ..I. 
If an action a succeeds in achieving a goal and no other actions delete that goal, then 
we can use the frame axiom to conclude that the goal continues to hold after additional 
actions occur. 
Here is a slightly more interesting example. Suppose that some goal is added to the 
database by the plan [. . . a] but deleted by [. . . b] . What should 3( [. . . a], [. . . b] ) 
be? 
The result should be 
[... a . ..I-[... b...]U[... b... a...] (57) 
since if both actions a and b occur, the goal will be true only if a occurs after b does. 
This fits neatly into the implementation details already discussed; the plan set (57) is 
conveniently written as an alternating sum. 
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It is because of examples such as this one that the operator 3 is defined on pairs of 
plan sets. We cannot find a unary 3’ such that 
3(P, Q> = 3’(P) - 3'(Q) 
because, as we see from (57), the plan sets P and Q interact in the construction of 
3(P,Q). 
The reason the frame operator is important is because a planning database will typ- 
ically indicate only which actions actually add and delete fluents from the domain 
description; there will be no explicit description of the set of plans that achieve a given 
goal g. In order to construct these plans, we have to find the plans that add g to the 
database, and then use the frame operator 3 to actually construct the plan set in its 
entirety. Working with actions that delete g allows us to compute P-,g similarly. 
In all of the examples we have encountered, if P and P’ are approximately equal and 
Q and Q’ are as well, then 3( P, Q) is approximately equal to 3( P’, Q’). This is as it 
should be if our ideas are to be usefully incorporated into systems that use the frame 
axiom; it also serves to provide loose confirmation of the utility of our measure-theoretic 
notion of when one set of plans is small relative to another. 
The function 3 has a variety of analogs in earlier work. We have already remarked 
on its clear connection to the frame axiom; since it is accepts information about the 
plans where facts are added or deleted from the database and returns information about 
when those facts hold generally, it is also the analog in our setting of what Chapman 
and others have called the modal truth criterion [ 11. 
The collection of all plan sets is a lattice under the subset relation; more formally, the 
set of plan sets is naturally isomorphic to the set of functions from the set S of linear 
plans into the two-point set 2 = {t, f}. For a particular plan set P and plan p, P(p) = t 
if p E P and P(p) = f otherwise. The set 2’ inherits a lattice structure from the lattice 
structure on 2, and it is not hard to extend this structure to embed 2’ in a bilattice 
[ 51. A function that maps bilattice elements to new bilattice elements is referred to as a 
modal operator [ 71 because there is a natural relationship between such functions and 
the existing notion of modality [ 151 in the philosophical community, and 3 is indeed a 
modal operator in this setting. I also suggest elsewhere [ 6 3 that the frame operator can 
be viewed modally. 
The point of this embedding is that it allows us to treat 3 as a semantic object 
in a bilattice setting. We can use the declarative mechanisms that exist in the bilattice 
framework to manipulate the plan sets in question; we do not need to construct a special- 
purpose planner but can instead resort to a general multivalued theorem prover 19,111. 
All we need do is provide a declarative description of action. 
The first axiom in this declarative description needs to capture a STRIPS-like frame 
axiom as in Definition 5.1. To do this, consider the statement “g has just been achieved”. 
This sentence is true for plans sets that terminate with an action that adds g; “g has just 
been removed” is true for plan sets that terminate in actions deleting g. 
To formalize this, we reify g and add a predicate triggers; we wiii take 
triggers(g) to mean that g has just been added and triggers(lg) to mean that 
g has just been deleted. Using the frame modality 3, we can now write 
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F[triggers(g),triggers(lg)] 3 holds(g). 
This allows us to use the information in F to find plan sets that achieve g (i.e., plan 
sets for which g holds). 
The rest of the axiomatization defines the extent of triggers: 
adds(a,p) Asucceeds >triggers(p), (58) 
deletes( a,p) A succeeds(a) > triggers( lp), (59) 
occurs(u) A precs( a, 1) A precs-ok( I) 3 succeeds(u), (60) 
holds(p) A precs-ok(l) > precs-ok( [PI/] ), (61) 
precs-ok( [ I). (62) 
Axioms (58) and (59) tell us that successful actions add and delete facts as appropriate 
to the database, and the remaining axioms describe situations under which actions 
succeed-they succeed if they occur and all of their preconditions are satisfied. A list 
of preconditions is satisfied if the first one is and all the rest are; the ground case is that 
an empty list of preconditions is always satisfied. The bracketed expressions in (61) 
and (62) are lists of preconditions and should not be confused with plans. 
Finally, we need to identify situations in which actions occur, so that the sentence 
occurs(u) is assigned the plan set [. . . a] and succeeds( init) is assigned the plan 
set [ ] where init is a dummy action that sets up the initial situation. (We could 
instead say that init occurs in the initial situation and has no preconditions, but that 
would be somewhat less compact.) We can now add specific information about the 
initial situation by writing, for example, that 
adds(init, on(C, 0)) 
to say that C is on D in the initial situation. 
There are other advantages to exploiting the bilattice machinery for planning purposes, 
since this approach allows us to use a declarative description of action instead of a 
procedural one. We can add actions that require some variable amount of time to take 
effect (boiling water comes to mind), have effects without duration (like popping a 
balloon causing a noise) [ 81, or have ramifications that need to be computed based 
on the values of other fluents [3,13]. All of this work remains in the same overall 
declarative framework and continues to use this framework to provide the machinery 
needed for planning. As discussed elsewhere [ 121, we can also introduce defaults into 
the declarative language, thereby capturing in our setting the ideas typically associated 
with hierarchical planners. 
5.3. Status 
The current implementation is a good-but not perfect-match for the theoretical 
constructs that we have discussed. Plans and plan sets are both implemented as described. 
The examples of Section 4 make some specific control assumptions about the nature 
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of the search, and these control decisions are not yet supported by the implementation. 
(In a bilattice setting, they appear to be restrictions to planning of more general control 
heuristics, and we are attempting to implement these general control notions as opposed 
to specializations of them.) 
Rather than invoke Theorem 4.7 directly, the planner works by determining at each 
point whether a particular line of reasoning will have a significant impact on its overall 
answer. In other words, it decides whether or not its answer would change on a set of 
measure 0 relative to the current value. This is in keeping with the analysis of Section 
4, where we curtailed some portion of the analysis as soon as we could tell that the 
answer didn’t matter. Theorem 4.7 guarantees that there always will be a point at which 
things are clearly irrelevant; the implementation is often able to terminate its reasoning 
before the conditions of the theorem are satisfied. Most of the time used by the planner 
is spent in reasoning of just this sort, deciding whether a particular line of reasoning 
might impact the plan being generated. 
6. Conclusion 
My overall aim in this paper has been to describe a single idea: that planners hould 
manipulate not specialized plans that are guaranteed to achieve their goals, but more 
general plans that can only be expected to. We have presented a formalization of this 
idea of “expecting” a plan to achieve a goal in terms of the plan failing for a set of 
measure 0 in the set of its possible executions. 
Building a planner around this idea introduces additional possibilities that existing 
planners lack; most important among these is that it is possible to combine approximate 
plans for each of two subgoals to obtain an approximate plan for their conjunction. 
The main technical result of the paper is Theorem 4.7, which confirms this observation. 
An examination of the tower-construction problem indicates that such a planner will 
have advantages over a conventional one in that it will debug plans constructed using 
independence assumptions as opposed to catering to all possible plan interactions at the 
outset. 
Finally, we discussed briefly an implementation f our ideas that exploits the fact that 
plan sets can be viewed as elements of a bilattice. As mentioned in the introduction, 
some existing planners uch as O-Plan appear to make informal use of the ideas that we 
have discussed, but we know of no planner that explicitly conforms to the notions we 
have presented. A preliminary implementation of such a planner has been built using 
the bilattice-based theorem prover MVL [ 113, but many implementation issues remain 
to be addressed. Dealing with these is the topic of ongoing research. 
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Appendix A. Proofs 
Lemma2.4. rf(A,<,*) isaplan, thenforanya,b,cEA: 
(1) Ifa*banda*c, thenb=c. 
(2) Zfa*candb*c, thena=b. 
Proof. If a * b and a * c, then a * b and a < c, so that b < c. Since a * c and a < b, 
c < b as well; thus b = c. The second claim is similar. 0 
Lemma25 Let (A,<,*) beaplan. Thenforanya,b,cEA: 
(1) Ifc<bandc?a, theneithercTbora<b. 
(2) IfbGcandaZc, theneitherbTcorb<a. 
Proof. Suppose that c < b and c T a but not c T b. We prove that a 6 b by induction 
on the length of the chain 
c = CO * . . . * c, = a. 
If n = 0, then c = a and since c < b, we have a 6 b. For the inductive case, suppose 
that the lemma holds for chains of length n - 1. Then in the above example, since c * cl 
and c < b, we must have cl < b. Since cl T a as well, we can apply the inductive 
hypothesis to conclude a 6 b. 0 
Lemma2.6. Let (A,<,*) beaplan. Thenforanya,b,cEA, ifa*banda<c<b, 
then a Z c. 
Proof. Suppose we have 
a = a0 * . . . * a, = 6. 
For each ai in the chain, if ai- < c, we can conclude that ai < c. Thus if aj < c for 
each j, we eventually conclude b < c, so that b = c. It follows that c actually appears 
somewhere in the above chain, so that a ?; c. 0 
Proposition 2.9. The instance relation of Definition 2.8 is a partial order. 
Proof. That the relation is reflexive and transitive is clear; to see that it is antisymmetric, 
if (~1 is the binding list associated with showing that p1 is an instance of p2 and ~72 is 
the binding list showing that p2 is an instance of ~1, then for any action a in ~1, we 
must have alv,la2 = a, so that the actions differ only in the names of the variables. 0 
Lemma 2.11. If P = (A, <, *) is a linear plan, then < is a total order. 
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Proof. Suppose that we have a < b and a < c with b and c unordered. Then since 
6 = % , there must be bi and c; such that 
a * bo * . . . * 6, = b 
a * CO * . . . * c, = c. 
If either of the above sequences is contained in the other, then we will have b < c or 
c < b, so suppose otherwise. Now if i is the first point at which the sequences differ, 
there is a single point bi-1 with bi_1 * bi and bi_1 * ci but bi f ci, in conflict with 
Lemma 2.4. Cl 
Proposition 2.12. 9 C P2 if and only if the set of linearizations of PI is a subset of 
the set of linearizations of P2. 
Proof. One direction is easy: if PI C P2, every instance of PI is an instance of P2 
because C is transitive. 
For the other direction, suppose that every linearization of PI = (Al, <I, rl) is a 
linearization of P2 = (AZ, <2, *2). Specifically, consider the linear plan L in which 61 
has been extended to a total order and the actions in Al have been made ground by 
binding the variables to unique Skolem constants. Since this is a linearization of P2, 
there must be a binding list u and injection i that embeds P2 in L. If we modify (+ to 
change the Skolem constants back to the variables they represent in Al, we get a binding 
list CT’ and injection i : A2 4 AI that injects the actions in A2 into Al. It remains only 
to show that i preserves < and *. 
If we had a * b in P2 without the corresponding relation holding in PI, we could add 
an extra action between a and b in the linear plan L to construct a plan that was a 
linearization of PI but not of P2, so it follows that * is preserved. 
To see that < is preserved, suppose that a < b in P2 but not in PI. Now it follows 
from the lemmas that in PI, where a $ b, if a F c or c _* a, we must not have c < b 
either. Thus b is unordered in PI with respect to all the points related to a by * . We 
can continue to satisfy Definition 2.2 if we add (in PI ) that b < c for all such points; 
suppose that we call the resulting plan P,‘. It is clear that P,’ has linearizations that P2 
lacks, since a > b in PI but a f b in P2. But since P,’ is an instance of 4, this is a 
contradiction. Thus whenever a < b in 4, a ,< b in PI as well. < is preserved by i, 
and the proof is complete. 0 
Proposition 3.4. Let P be a plan, and P’ an instance of P with i the associated injection 
from A to A’. Then if there is any action in A’ - i(A) that is not a variable, P’ is of 
measure 0 in P. 
Proof. Let P” be a plan that is identical to P’ but where some nonvariable action in 
A’ - i(A) has been replaced with a new variable. Now it is clear that P” is an instance 
of P, and that P’ is of measure 0 in P” (since it binds the new variable). Thus P’ is 
of measure 0 in P. 0 
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Lemma 3.6. Q is of measure 0 in P if any of the following conditions holds: 
(1) Q is empty. 
(2) Q is a subset of a set of measure 0 in P. 
(3) Q is of measure 0 in a subset of P. 
(4) Q is of measure 0 in a superset S of P with P of measure 1 in S. 
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Proof. ( 1) The empty set is the finite union of no sets, each of which is of measure 0 
in P. 
(2) Take R to be the given set of measure 0 in P, and S = P. 
(3) Take R = Q and S to be the given subset of P. Now S - P = 0. 
(4) Take R = Q and S as given; since P is of measure 1 in S, S - P is of measure 
0 in S. Cl 
Lemma 3.7. Q is of measure 0 in P if and only if Q is of measure 0 in P U Q. 
Proof. Since P C P U Q, it is clear that Q is of measure 0 in the union if it is of 
measure 0 in P. For the converse, take R = Q and S = P U Q in the definition; since 
Q is of measure 0 in S, we must have S - P of measure 0 in S as well. Thus Q is of 
measure 0 in P. 0 
Proposition 3.8. Approximate equality is an equivalence relation. 
Proof. That approximate equality is reflexive and symmetric is clear; we need only 
show that it is transitive. To see this, suppose that X is approximately equal to Y and Y 
is approximately equal to Z. We will show that X is of measure 1 in Z; that Z is of 
measure 1 in X is similar. 
We need to show that Z - X is of measure 0 in Z. but we know that 
z-XC(Z-Y)U(Y-X). (A.1) 
The first term here is of measure 0 in Z because Y is of measure 1 in Z. The second 
term is of measure 0 in Y; since Z is of measure 1 in Y, it follows that the second term 
is of measure 0 in Z as well. Thus the union in (A.l) is of measure 0 in Z and X is 
of measure 1 in Z. 0 
Proposition 3.9. Let P # 8 be a plan set. Then provided that our language includes 
infinitely many object and action constants, there is no plan set that is both of measure 
0 and of measure 1 in P. 
Proof. The proof of this result is essentially unchanged from that of the analogous 
Proposition 3.3 of [lo]. 
If there were a subset Q of a plan set P that was both of measure 0 and of measure 1 
in P, then we could repeatedly apply the secondary clauses of Definition 3.3 to construct 
a finite collection of plan sets Qi and a plan set S = Ui Qi such that each Qi = SI, for 
some nontrivial Ui. 
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We can suppose without loss of generality that S contains a single variable ?; the 
general case is no harder. For Sj an arbitrary Skolem constant in our language, let Sj be 
a linearization of S in which ? has been bound to Sj. Since Sj will be an instance of 
Qi = SICi only if (pi binds ? to Sj, it follows that each Qi can contain at most one of the 
various Sj. Since there are an infinite number of Skolem constants available, S cannot 
be the union of finitely many Qi. 0 
Lemma 3.11. Suppose we have a sequence Pi of plan sets, where Pi+1 is of measure 0 
in Pi for each i. Then the Pi converge to the empty set. 
Proof. Let P be an arbitrary linear plan that appears in infinitely many of the Pi, and 
consider only the subsequence of the Pi’s whose elements contain P. We can assume 
without loss of generality that each Pi contains Pt+l, since Pi+1 is of measure 0 in Pi if 
and only if it is of measure 0 in the union Pi U Pi+, ; we can also assume that each Pt 
is a minimal such set such that Pi+1 is of measure 0 in Pi. 
Given these assumptions, Pi must have been constructed from Pi+1 by either replacing 
a subexpression with a variable (for example, replacing move(x, block-on(?) ) with 
move( x, ?) ) or by introducing a new variable to replace an object constant or variable 
in the plan. Since if the eventual plan P contains n object or action constants it will 
contain at most n subexpressions as well, it follows that the maximum length of a chain 
where every element contains P will be n*. This is in conflict with the assumption that 
P appears in infinitely many Pi, and the proof is complete. 0 
Lemma 3.12. Suppose S is of measure 1 in T and of measure 0 in U. Then T is of 
measure 0 in U. 
Proof. We show instead that T is of measure 0 in T U U, which is equivalent. We know 
that T - S is of measure 0 in T, thus of measure 0 in T U U. S is also of measure 0 in 
TUU,soTc(T-S)USisofmeasureOinTUUaswell. 0 
Proposition 3.13. Suppose that there is some set D that is of measure 1 in A 8 B and 
of measure 0 in A. Then A and B are approximately equal. 
Proof. SupposethatA-B=FandB-A=E,sothatA8B=EUF.NowifDisof 
measure 1 in E U F and of measure 0 in A, we know that E U F must be of measure 0 
in A. Thus F is of measure 0 in A and B is of measure 1 in A. 
But we also have that since E U F is of measure 0 in A, it is of measure 0 in 
A U E U F = B U ‘F. Thus F is of measure 0 in B U F, and F is of measure 0 in B. 
In other words, B is of measure 1 in B U F. Since E is also of measure 0 in B U F, 
it follows that E is of measure 0 in B and A is of measure 1 in B. Thus A and B are 
approximately equal. 0 
Theorem 4.3. Given a planning system P and a goal g, the planning sequence generated 
by P for g converges to L(g). 
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Proof. We begin by showing that the sequence converges, and then argue that it con- 
verges to L(g). 
To see that it converges, it suffices to show that the symmetric differences between 
successive lements of the planning sequence converge to the empty set. But at each 
step of the construction we will have (for example) 
Q(g) = P(% R-1 (g) ) 
for i even. 
Now we know that L( Tg) fl Pi-1 (g) is of measure 1 in Dii, but since Pi-t (g) = 
Pi-z(g) U Di_1, we GUI conclude that 
But we also know that [ L( lg) nPi_2(g) ] is of measure 0 in 24_2, since the i-2nd step 
was supposed to remove all plans that failed to achieve g. Similarly, [ L( -g) fl Di- 11 
is of measure 0 in Di_ 1, since the i - 1 st step was supposed to add only plans that did 
achieve g. It follows that 
]L(lg) nPi-2(g)] U [L(3) nQ-11 
is of measure 0 in Di-1 U Vi-27 and thus by Lemma 3.12 that ‘Di is of measure 0 in 
Vi-1 U Di-2. 
This result holds for odd i as well by virtue of a similar argument. 
NOW suppose that we construct a new sequence Si, where Si = D2i U Dzi+t . We can 
apply Lemma 3.11 to conclude that the &‘i converge to 8, from which it follows that the 
Di do as well. Thus the planning sequence converges. 
The argument hat it converges to L(g) is similar; at each step in the construction, 
we remove a set of measure 1 in the remaining error. Thus the sequence of symmetric 
differences between Pi(g) and L(g) also converges to 0, and the proof is complete. q 
Proposition 4.5. There exist plans Pi, 4, Ql and Q2 with Qi of measure 0 in Pi but 
Ql n Q2 of measure 1 in PI rl P2. 
Proof. An example follows the statement of the proposition in the main text. q 
Theorem 4.7. Suppose that we have a conjunctive goal gl A g2 and a set P. Construct 
the plan sequences Pi converging to L(gl) n P and Qt converging to L(g2) fl P. Now 
we can always$nd an i and a j such that both Pi 8 Pi+, and Qj 8 Qj+l are of measure 
0 in Pi nQj. For any such i and j, Pi nQj will be approximately equal to L(gl Ag2) n P. 
Proof. The proof rests on the following proposition: 
Proposition A.l. Let f( PI, . . . , P,) be a function on plan sets that distributes with 
respect to set-theoretic union and such that f ( PI, . . . , P,, ) & Pi for each i. Now suppose 
that for each i, we have a sequence 
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that converges to Pi and such that if we take Au = Ptj 8 Pij+l, each Atj is of measure 1 
in Pi@Ptj. Thenprovided f(P,,...,P,,) $I 8: 
( 1) There is u collection of indices fi such that Aiji is of measure 0 in f ( Ptji) for 
each i, and 
(2) For any such set of indices, f (Pi) and f ( Piji) are approximately equal. 
Proof. We prove the result for n = 1 only; the general case is no harder. 
Suppose, then, that f(P) is a function on plan sets that distributes with respect o 
set-theoretic union and such that f(P) G P. Suppose also that we have a sequence Pi 
that converges to P and such if we take Aj = Pj 0 Pj+l, each Aj is of measure 1 in 
P 8 Pi. Then provided f(P) # 8, we must show that: 
( 1) There is an index j such that Aj is of measure 0 in f (Pi), and 
(2) For any such index, f(P) and f (Pj) are approximately equal. 
TO see this, fix i and say that P = (Pi - A) U B, SO that P U A = Pi U B. Now 
f(P) uf(A)=f(P) ‘Jf(B) 
since f distributes with respect o U. It follows that 
f(P) ef(Pi) C f(A) U f(B) C AUB=PBPi 
and therefore that At is of measure 1 in f(P) 8 f (Pi). 
Since f(P) # 8 and the At’s are converging to 0, it follows that there is some fixed 
j such that Aj is of measure 0 in f(P). But now we can apply Proposition 3.13 to 
conclude that f(P) and f (Pj) are approximately equal. 
Since f(P) and f (Pj) are approximately equal, Aj must be of measure 0 in f (Pj), 
and the first part of the proposition is proved. 
The second part of the proposition is proved as well; if Aj is of measure 0 in f (Pj), 
we know it is of measure 1 in f(P) 8 f (Pi), so f (Pi) and f(P) must be approximately 
equal. 0 
To prove the original theorem, we can now simply take f = 13; the conditions on 
the A’s are guaranteed by the approximate validity of the fashion in which the planning 
sequences for the subgoals are constructed. Cl 
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